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Sarong Gals: Green Light for the
Red Light Abatement Law
INTRODUCTION
In People ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals,' decided August 3,
1972, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Red Light
Abatement Law 2 may be applied to enjoin obscene stage enter-
tainment in the form of nude dancing. The Court ruled that the
Act applies even though there is no evidence of prostitution.
Sarong Gals represents the first time an appellate court has
reviewed the validity of the Red Light Abatement Law as it applies
to lewd dancing. The Court, however, declined the opportunity
to review the constitutionality of the Act's remedies, reasoning
that the entertainment offered by the bar was so patently obscene
that no countervailing constitutional consideration was needed.
It is the purpose of this case note to call attention to the fact
that serious constitutional questions do arise when the Red Light
Abatement Law is applied in the field of obscenity. In order to
accomplish this objective, it will be necessary to examine the de-
cision itself, the rationale and authorities employed by the Court
in arriving at the decision, the Red Light Abatement Law, and the
constitutional effect which the Act will have upon First Amend-
ment rights.
THE RED LIGHT ABATEMENT LAW
The Act itself was initially adopted in 1913, 3 and as its name
implies had for its principal objective the abatement of houses of
prostitution.4 Such a narrow interpretation, however, never has
been given the Act in application. Indeed, the Act has been read
broadly as applying to all places used for the purposes of illegal
sexual activity.5
1. 27 Cal. App.3d 46, 103 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1972).
2. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, sections 11225-11235 (West 1970).
3. Additions and amendments by Statutes in 1953 and 1969.
4. Board of Supervisors, County of Los Angeles v. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d
671, 227 P.2d 14 (1951).
5. See notes 17-18 infra.
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The Act is penal in nature, and thus auxiliary to the enforce-
ment of the criminal law; but a case brought under the Act is
considered to be a civil case.6 The proceedings are in equity and
designed to facilitate a summary method for initiating an in rem
action against property deemed a public nuisance.7
The Statute begins by defining a "Red Light" nuisance:
Every building or place used for the purpose of illegal gambling
as defined by state law or local ordinance, lewdness, assignation,
or prostitution and every building or place in or upon which acts
of illegal gambling as defined by state law or local ordinance,
lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, are held or occur, is a
nuisance ... 8
The Statute then provides that such place shall be enjoined and
abated. The Court petitioned for relief is empowered to issue a
preliminary injunction to prevent the continuance of the nuisance.9
This injunction remains in effect pendente lite. Of particular
importance is the fact that the temporary injunction can be ordered
without the necessity of an adversary hearing or notice to the
named defendant, and may be based on the allegations of the
verified complaint alone.'0
The heart of the Red Light Abatement Law, CALIFORNIA PENAL
CODE Section 11230, describes the permanent relief available under
the Act.
If the existence of a nuisance is established in an action as pro-
vided in this article, an order of abatement shall be entered as
part of the judgment in the case, directing the removal from the
building or place of all fixtures, musical instruments and movable
property used in conducting, maintaining, aiding or abetting the
nuisance, and directing the sale thereof in the manner provided
for the sale of chattels under execution, and the effectual closing
of the building or place against its use for any purpose, and that
6. Courts have variously referred to the Act as both penal in nature,
and civil in nature. It seems more accurate to refer to the Act as penal in
nature when it is employed to aid in the enforcement of obscenity regu-
lation. See People ex rel. Bradford v. Arcega, 49 Cal. App. 239, 193 P.
264 (1920).
7. People ex rel. Bradford v. Barbiere, 33 Cal.App. 770, 166 P. 812
(1917).
8. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, section 11225 (West 1970).
9. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, section 11227 (West 1970).
10. Id. However, this was not the case in the Sarong Gals case where
the issuance of the temporary injunction was preceded by an adversary
hearing.
it be kept closed for a period of one year, unless sooner released
• 11
The proceeds from the sale of the movable property are applied
to pay for the costs of the removal and sale of the property, the cost
of keeping the building closed, and the petitioner's costs of litiga-
tion.12 If the proceeds from the sale of the buildings furnishings
do not fully discharge these costs, then the building itself may be
sold to make up the deficiency.13  Evidence of the general reputa-
tion of the premises in the community is sufficient to prove the
character of the house as a public nuisance and condition the above
relief.14 More importantly, because the action is in rem against
the property sought to be abated, the knowledge of the owner that
the premises are being used for the purposes of lewdness or prosti-
tution is not required to obtain a forfeiture against him.' 5
It was with no detailed consideration of the above provisions
that the Court arrived at its decision in Sarong Gals. Had the
Court considered them, it would have discovered the serious con-
stitutional questions inherent in the application of the Act. The
following section will examine the Court's decision and the reasons
behind the failure to give a thorough inspection to the constitutional
implications of the Red Light Abatement Law.
THE CASE
On December 23, 1970, culminating months of surveillance and
observation, the Orange County District Attorney filed a com-
plaint under the Red Light Abatement Law seeking to abate and
enjoin the Sarong Gals bar and its entertainment as a public
nuisance. After a hearing on the merits of the complaint, at
which the District Attorney presented numerous affidavits of
undercover agents, the Court issued a temporary injunction pro-
hibiting the named defendants "Sarong Gals" and Seemaygro,
11. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, section 11230 (West 1970). But ".
prior to judgment the court may not take possession of the questioned
premesis, by placing keepers therein, nor may it order the same closed."
People ex rel. Woolwine v. Feraud, 45 Cal. App. 765, 768, 188 P. 843, 844
(1920).
12. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, section 11231 (West 1970).
13. Id.
14. See People v. Macy, 43 Cal.App. 479, 184 P. 1008 (1919). ".
evidence of the general reputation of a place is admissible for the purpose
of proving the existence of a nuisance." CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, section
11228 (West 1970).
15. "The fact that the court did not find that Ingersoll had knowledge,
etc., that such nuisance was being conducted on his premises, we think is
immaterial." People v. McCaddon, 48 Cal. App. 790, 792, 192 P. 325, 326
(1920). See also, People ex rel. Bradford v. Barbiere, 33 Cal.App. 770,
166 P. 812 (1917) ; People v. Casa Co., 35 Cal. App. 194, 169 P. 454 (1917).
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Inc., from: a) using the premises for the purpose of lewdness,
b) permitting performances graphically depicting sexual activity,
c) conducting any entertainment whereby the performer's geni-
talia or anus was visible to any other person.16
Two subsequent petitions by defendants for writs of prohibition
seeking to annul and vacate the temporary injunction were denied
without opinion. The defendants then petitioned the issuing court
to dissolve the injunction; this petition was denied, and the de-
fendants appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The
Court modified the injunction by striking paragraph (c), but
affirmed the remaining sections (a) and (b).
THE CoURT's DEcIsIoN
The initial question which the Court had to resolve was whether
the Red Light Abatement Law could properly be used to enjoin
continuing acts of lewdness without the accompanying incidents
of prostitution. People v. Bayside Land Company'7 had deter-
mined that the word "lewdness" as used in the Act is of broader
significance than the words "assignation" or "prostitution," and
includes all immoral and degenerate conduct or conversation.
The Court in Bayside decided that the term "lewdness" was
adopted specifically to prevent acts revolting and disgusting in
themselves, although not technically qualifying as acts of prostitu-
tion.
16. In toto, the injunction read:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that during the pendency of this
action, all defendants herein who have been served, and each of
them, shall be and they are hereby enjoined and restrained from
in any way or manner, personally or through any agent, servant,
tenant, representative, employee or inmate, directly or indirectly,
or in any manner whatsoever, any of the following acts
a. Erecting, establishing, conducting, using, owning or releas-
ing the grounds, building or premises described in the com-
plaint, to further use for the purpose of lewdness, assignation
or interferences with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property by the neighborhood, and
b. Conducting or permitting to be conducted upon or within
said grounds, building and premises any performance which
demonstrates or graphically depicts sexual intercourse, mastur-
bation, fellation (sic) cunnilingus, bestiality, buggery, or maso-
chism, and
c. Conducting or permitting to be conducted upon or within
said grounds, building or premises any performance wherein
or whereby any person's genitalia or anus is visible to any
other person.
17. 48 Cal. App. 257, 191 P. 994 (1920).
Again, in People ex rel. Bradford v. Arcega, this interpretation
of the Act was reaffirmed.
Even if prostitution or assignation was not thus sufficiently shown
to have been practiced in the place, it is clear that lewdness was
so shown, and obviously the nuisance upon which the statute
places its ban may consist alone of acts of lewdness.' 8
Thus, supported by this interpretation, Sarong Gals held that the
Red Light Abatement Law can be used to abate acts of lewdness
sans evidence of prostitution.
The most important issue raised in the case was whether the
injunctive relief provided for under the Act could properly be used
to enjoin live entertainment taking the form of lewd dancing. The
defendant's argument, as interpreted by the Court, against allow-
ing the Act to be used to enjoin such entertainment was basically
this: Since nude dancing is protected under the First Amendment,
lewd, nude dancing should also receive First Amendment protec-
tion. 19 To enjoin lewd, nude dancing would, therefore, be unconsti-
tutional as a violation of the right to freedom of expression. The
Court, however, quickly rejected this argument by holding that
although nude dancing is protected by the First Amendment, it is
a long and illogical step to the conclusion that lewd, nude dancing
is likewise protected. The dancing performed in the Sarong Gals
bar was labeled by the Court as simple obscene conduct calculated
to arouse the latent sexual desires and imaginations of the viewers,
and not a mode of expressing emotion or dramatic feeling. What-
ever element of communication there may have been in such con-
duct was overshadowed by its emphasis upon and preoccupation
with gross sexuality. 20 In conclusion, the court admonished that
the patina "free expression" is not a self-serving sword which can
be used to draw commercialized lewdness under the mantel of
First Amendment protection.
There is a major shortcoming in the Court's inspection of the
above issue. This lies not in the conclusion reached or the reasoning
used, but in the argument considered. The weakness results from
18. 49 Cal. App. 239, 193 P. 264 (1920).
19. 27 Cal.App.3d 46, 50, 103 Cal. Rptr. 414, 417 (1972).
20. Although the Sarong Gals opinion does not specifically cite United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), it is obvious that the Court had the
principles of that case in mind when they variously referred to the dancing
involved as "conduct," "behavior," "activity," and "exhibitions." In
O'Brien the United States Supreme Court held that the extent to which
conduct is protected by the First Amendment depends upon the presence
of a communicative element. "We cannot accept the view that an ap-
parently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." 391
U.S., at 376.
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the fact that there is no real controversy presented by the argument
that lewd dancing should be a constitutionally protected form of
expression. The law is too well settled to seriously dispute that
obscene expression in whatever form is not protected by the First
Amendment. A more representative argument, and the argument
which the defendant claims to have made to the Appellate Court,
would have been the following:
While lewd or obscene dancing is not protected by the First
Amendment, it, like obscenity, which is likewise not protected
by the First Amendment, must be analyzed with First Amend-
ment principles and tools.21
Consideration of this proposition would have necessitated a thorough
examination of the Red Light Abatement Law and the constitu-
tional questions raised by the use Of the Act against live stage
entertainment. However, these considerations were not needed in
order to dispose with the illusory argument actually considered
by the Court, and therefore must be left for future decisions.
In holding that the Red Light Abatement Law could be used
against lewd, nude dancing the Court cited as authority for this
conclusion the case of Harmer v. Tonylyn Productions, Inc.
Harmer had previously rejected the applicability of the Act
to enjoin obscene films, but by way of dicta had specifically
distinguished live stage entertainment, stating:
The Red Light Abatement Law has been held by judicial con-
struction to apply to lewd live stage shows and exhibitions. 22
No authority is cited by the Harmer Court in support of the
conclusion that there exists in the law a distinction between motion
pictures and live stage entertainment. Indeed, when these two
forms of entertainment are viewed in a constitutional light they
are generally compared-not contrasted. The United States Su-
preme Court in California v. LaRue referred to the two in the
conjunctive, stating:.
... both motion pictures and theatrical productions are within the
protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.23
Likewise, in Barrows v. Municipal Court the California Supreme
Court, while considering the validity of certain Penal Code prohi-
21. Appellant's Brief, Petition for Hearing, 4th Civil No. 11982, p.10
(People ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals).
22. 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 943-944, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576, 577 (1972).
23. 409 U.S. 109, 112 (1972).
bitions against disorderly conduct and obscenity as they applied
to theatrical performers, noted that:
... live plays performed in a theater before an audience are
entitled to the same protection under the First Amendment as
motion pictures ... 24
For California courts to distinguish between live entertainment,
whether it be in the form of stage plays as in Barrows or in the
form of nude dancing as in Sarong Gals and motion pictures for
the purposes of the Red Light Abatement Law, while comparing
the two for the purposes of constitutional considerations would
seem an arbitrary distinction.
In the wake of the Court's decision it becomes necessary to
examine the question of whether lewd entertainment, although
not protected by the Constitution, is nevertheless entitled to be
analyzed by First Amendment principles before it may be en-
joined.
NUDE DANCING AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Application of the Red Light Abatement Law to enjoin acts of
gambling, prostitution, assignation, or lewdness standing alone
raises no countervailing constitutional implications. These illegal
activities, by themselves, are nowhere given protection under the
United States Constitution. Lewdness, the Court candidly observes,
is lewdness; as such it is purely and simply a forbidden form of
unlawful behavior. A critical problem arises, however, when the
word lewdness is used descriptively to define a form of nude
dancing. In the context the term lewdness becomes synonymous
with obscenity and must be analyzed accordingly.
The First Amendment does not purport to protect obscenity. 25
Yet "it does guarantee that certain standards shall be met if obscen-
ity is to be found. ' 28  "Neither nudity nor the depiction of sexual
activity ... are obscene as a matter of law. '27 In fact, In re
Giannini specifically holds that nude dancing is prima facie
protected by the First Amendment as both a form of expression
and communication.
The prima facie applicability of the First Amendment . . . does
not fail merely because the particular form of its manifestation
may be obnoxious to many persons ... it is as much entitled
to the protection of free speech as the best of [dance].28
24. 1 Cal. 3d 821, 824, 464 P.2d 483, 485, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819, 821 (1970).
25. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
26. Dixon v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco,
267 Cal. App. 2d 789, 73 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1968).
27. Sanita v. City of Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, 27
Cal. App. 3d 993, 104 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1972) n.4.
28. 69 Cal. 2d 563, 570, 446 P.2d 535, 540, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 660 (1968).
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California courts have gone to great lengths to assure the consti-
tutional protection of live entertainment. In Sanita v. Board
of Police Commissioners29 a nightclub performance entitled "The
Dance of Love," which consisted of two nude entertainers, a male
and a female, simulating acts of sexual intercourse and fellatio
was held to have, prima facie, the protection of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The dividing line separating protected speech from obscenity is
too elusive to allow for an abitrary determination of what is, or
is not obscene. 30 Nude dancing must retain the preferred position
under the First Amendment as does the most pristine of speech
until it is judicially determined that to the average person, applying
contemporary standards, the predominant appeal of the dance,
taken as a whole, is to the prurient interest and affronts the stan-
dards of decency accepted in the community.3 1 Only after such
judicial sorting can a prima facie legitimate form of expression
be condemned as obscene.
A CONSTITUTIONAL EXAMINATION OF THE RED
LIGHT ABATEMENT LAW
A state is not limited to the criminal process in seeking to protect
its citizens from the dissemination of obscenity.
Whether proscribed conduct is to be visited by a criminal prose-
cution or by a qui tam action or by an injunction or by some or all
of these remedies in combination is a matter within the legislature's
range of choice.32
The Red Light Abatement Law utilizes the equitable relief of the
injunction. This relief is intended to abate and prevent the con-
29. 27 Cal. App. 3d 993, 104 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1972). Other State courts
have applied constitutional protection to various types of stage entertain-
ment. Hudson v. United States (D.C. Ct. App. 1967), 234 A.2d 903.
Burlesque Shows. In Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 12 N.J. 267, 270, 96
A.2d 519 (1953), the New Jersey Supreme Court held: "The performance
of a play or show, whether burlesque or other kind of theatre, is a form
of speech and prima facie protected by the State and Federal Constitu-
tions . . ."
30. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
31. This is generally what is referred to as the "Roth Test." Adopted
by statute in CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, section 311 (West 1970). Amended
by statutes 1970.
32. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
tinuance or reoccurrence of the acts which constitute the claimed
nuisance. Acting as it does, the temporary injunction operates as
a prior restraint on acts threatened to occur in the future. Not
all prior restraints are deemed to be unconstitutional, yet they
all come before the courts bearing a heavy presumption against
their constitutional validity23. This burden is even heavier in the
case of live expression.
A prior restraint on live expression, as opposed to films or books,
would bear an even heavier burden of justification because the
content of the future expression is unknown and cannot be
presumed to be obscene. 34
A system of prior restraints has come to be tolerated only where
it is administered under the most careful judicial superintendence,
and where it provides for the most vigorous procedural safeguards
to insure against curtailment of constitutionally protected expres-
sion. 35 In light of this rationale, the procedures for obtaining a
preliminary injunction under the Red Light Abatement Law must
be reconsidered.
The Act allows a temporary injunction to issue ex parte without
the need of notice or opportunity to be heard being served on the
defendant to the action. In Carroll v. President. and Commission-
ers of Princess Anne, the procedure of granting injunctive relief
ex parte was condemned outright.
• ..there is no place within the area of basic freedoms guaranteed
by the First Amendment for such orders where no showing is
made that it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties
and give them an opportunity to participate.30
The majority of Supreme Court decisions which have considered
the issue of whether an adversary hearing must precede a restraint
on expression have involved the seizures of allegedly obscene books
and films pursuant to a search, warrant. It has been uniformly
held by the high court that by not providing for an adversary hear-
ing, the procedure leading to the seizure becomes constitutionally
defective.3 7 Logically, it would seem to follow that if, as the court
observes, prior restraint of live expression bears an even heavier
burden in proving its validity than does a prior restraint upon
33. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
34. 27 Cal. App. 3d 46, 52, 103 Cal. Rptr. 414, 418.
35. See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1960).
36. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
37. The teaching of our cases is that, because only a judicial determina-
tion in an adversary proceding insures the necessary sensitivity to freedom
of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices
to impose a valid final restraint." Freedman v. State of Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 58 (1965). • I
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books or movies, an injunction against nude dancing, a fortiori,
must be preceded by an adversary hearing.
The Act further provides that the temporary injunction may issue
on the bases of a verified complaint or accompanying affidavits
alone-no other proof is necessary if it appears from the face of
the complaint that a nuisance exists. One must wonder if this
sensitive procedural tool is what the Supreme Court had in mind
when they insisted ". . . that regulations of obscenity scrupulously
embody the most vigorous procedural safeguards. '38
Even rejecting the possibilities inherent under such a system
that protected expression may be enjoined on the basis of a false
complaint or overzealous affiant, cognizance should be made that
such a procedure cannot possibly consider the predominant appeal
of the matter taken as a whole.
• .. acts which are unlawful in a different context, circumstance,
or place, may be depicted or incorporated in a stage or screen
presentation and come within the protection of the First Amend-
ment . .. 9
To determine obscenity, the context in which the acts occurred
must be examined.40 It seems patently impossible for a magistrate
to make a searching determination of the obscenity of a live per-
formance on the basis of a complaint which need only plead the
conclusion of the petitioner that acts of lewdness occur continually.
As noted, the Red Light Abatement Law provides that a judgment
under the Act may order the closing and sale of a building and its
furnishings. In People v. Bayside Land Company4l this relief
was referred to as "drastic," but the Court concluded that the
evils sought to be remedied demanded such extreme treatment.
It is granted that a state may resort to various weapons in its
fight against obscenity; but it is far from free to adopt whatever
penalties it pleases in supplementing those laws. The prohibitions
which a state adopts must be drawn so as to insure against the
curtailment of constitutionally protected expression. The extreme
relief available under the Act necessarily invites inquiry as to
38. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
39. In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 572, 446 P.2d 535, 541, 72 Cal. Rptr.
655, 661 (1968).
40. See Zeitlin x. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr.
800 (1963).
41. 48 Cal. App. 257, 261, 191 P. 994, 995 (1920).
whether these prohibitions are overly broad and repressive of free
speech. If the Red Light Abatement Law restricts protected
speech as well as obscenity, then it places an unconstitutional
restraint upon First Amendment rights, and as such must be
judicially condemned.
The rationale underlying so severe a penalty as the closing of a
bar offering lewd entertainment is the assumption that lewd con-
duct continually offered in the past will undoubtedly continue in
the future, and the total abatement of the bar itself is the only
way to prevent the reoccurrence of the illegal acts. There can
be no dispute that the remedy will prevent the recurrence of the
illegal acts, but the assumption that the prior illegal conduct will
undoubtedly recur is questionable.
Perrine v. Municipal Court'2 examined the validity of such an
assumption. There the Court held that it was constitutionally
impermissible to deny an applicant a license to operate a book-
store on the grounds that he had suffered a prior obscenity
conviction. The Court reasoned that a prior course of conduct
does not lead to the conclusion that the same offense would be
committed in the future. The rationale of Perrine and the
rationale of the Act are in direct conflict. If the holding of the
California Supreme Court is to be followed, must not the extreme
penalties of the Red Light Abatement Law be rejected as unsup-
ported by logic?
The Sarong Gals decision itself cautioned against the repressive
effect which the Statute has upon protected speech, stating:
While the Red Light Abatement Law can be applied to enjoin
obscene stage conduct such as the graphic depiction of sexual
activity . . . it cannot be used to prohibit free expression that is
not obscene. 43
This warning presents a dilemma in that future courts which are
petitioned to order the complete closing of an establishment must
first determine whether legitimate entertainment is involved. If
the bar offers legitimate nude dancing as well as lewd, nude dancing,
the Red Light Abatement Law may not be relied upon. An order
closing a bar under such circumstances would likewise be in con-
flict with the constitutional mandate prohibiting overly-broad
penalties in the area of First Amendment rights.
When a statute ... completely prohibits protected activities
although a narrower measure would fully achieve the intended
ends and at the same time preserve an effective place for the
42. 5 Cal. 3d 656, 488 P.2d 648, 97 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1971).
43. 27 Cal. App. 3d 46, 52, 103 Cal. Rptr. 414, 418 (1972).
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dissemination of ideas, its overbreadth may render it unconstitu-
tional.4 4
One final problem is presented by the Red Light Abatement
Law. Since it is an action in rem to abate specific property used
for the purposes of lewdness, it is not necessary that the owner of
the property involved have knowledge of the illegal purpose to
which the property is put as a condition to relief.
If, therefore, a building or property is so used as to make it a
nuisance under the statute, the nuisance may be abated ... not-
withstanding that the owner had no knowledge that it was used
for the unlawful purpose constituting the nuisance. 45
For the purposes of the Act knowledge of illegal activities is im-
puted to the owner. It is presumed that one who owns a bar is
aware, or with a minimum of effort could be aware, of any unlawful
entertainment offered by his establishment. As a result of this
presumption, actual knowledge is not considered to be a condition
to relief. Such reasoning, however, has recently been rejected.
In People v. Andrews the defendants were charged with the illegal
sale of obscene material. There was no proof offered by the prose-
cution that the defendants had knowledge of the character of the
material (photographs), although they were shown to be the own-
ers of the property where the sales were made. The Court reversed
the convictions.
The showing that the defendants Andrews and Smith owned the
establishments where the sales were made was not enough to prove
they knew the character of the material.46
Beginning with Smith v. California47 it has become accepted
that an obscenity prosecution requires proof of the element of
scienter. It is necessary to show that a defendant at least had
some knowledge of the character of the material he is charged
with disseminating. The California Penal Code defines "knowingly"
as "being aware of the character of the matter or live conduct. '48
This does not mean that an accused need have specific knowledge
that the material or conduct will actually be held obscene in a
44. Mandel v. Municipal Court For Oakland-Piedmont Judicial District,
County of Alameda, 276 Cal.App.2d 649, 662, 81 Cal. Rptr. 173, 181 (1969).
45. People ex rel. Bradford v. Barbiere, 33 Cal.App. 770, 779, 166 P. 812,
815 (1917).
46. 23 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, Supp. 8, 100 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1972).
47. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
48. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, section 311 (e) (West 1970). Amended by
Statutes 1970.
court of law; such a burden of proof would all but nullify the
power of a state to deal with obscenity. On the other hand, a
statute imposing strict liability for the mere possession of obscene
material is unconstitutional on its face. Yet the Red Light Abate-
ment Law imposes strict liability in the form of a forfeiture upon
the legal owner of an establishment found to offer obscene enter-
tainment, irrespective of the owner's knowledge or innocence of
the illegal entertainment. An absolute penalty such as this cannot
be tolerated, especially in the area of First Amendment guarantees.
The result of imposing strict liability would lead to a self-imposed
system of prior restraints upon legitimate dance out of fear of
forfeiture.
CONCLUSION
The Sarong Gals decision does not purport to be a searching
inquiry into, and ratification of, the Red Light Abatement Law as
it applies to the field of obscenity. The Court limited itself to the
issue of whether an injunction ordered under the authority of the
Act, and preceded by an adversary hearing, was a proper means
of prohibiting patently obscene nude dancing. Concluding that the
dancing was purely and simply obscene and therefore involved no
First Amendment considerations, the Court refrained from under-
taking a constitutional examination of the Act.
The immediate effect of the decision will undoubtedly result in
a marked increase in the use of the Red Light Abatement Law to
combat all forms of obscenity. Caution should be taken, however,
that such reliance is not misplaced. Many questions remain un-
answered in the wake of Sarong Gals, and the likelihood of a
thorough judicial examination of the Act, and in particular its
constitutional implications upon the First Amendment must be
anticipated.
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